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Abstract This article contributes to literature on corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR) exhibited by industrial
clusters in developing countries. The authors conceptualize
and empirically investigate the role of donor-funded CSR
initiatives aimed at promoting collective action by cluster-
based small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). A case
study of the Sialkot football-manufacturing cluster in
Pakistan indicates that donor-funded support of CSR ini-
tiatives in industrial clusters in developing countries may
be short-lived, due to the political economy of aid, the
national context of CSR implementation, tensions within
SME networks, and negative perceptions of CSR by the
cluster-based SMEs themselves. The findings and impli-
cations of this analysis can inform both research and policy
making in this area.
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Industrial clusters, or agglomerations of small- and med-
ium-sized firms (SMEs)1 in the same or related industries
(Giuliani 2005), have great potential to enhance the com-
petitiveness of export-oriented enterprises, create jobs in
local economic regions, and enhance living standards in
developing countries (Giuliani et al. 2005; Morrison et al.
2013; Pyke and Sengenberger 1992). Industrial clusters
provide SMEs with both passive and active benefits. Pas-
sive benefits accrue as a result of the SMEs’ co-location
with other firms and institutions in a geographically con-
fined space (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010). For exam-
ple, local SMEs might benefit from the presence of input
suppliers, specialized consultancy firms, a trained work-
force, purchasing departments of national/international
customers, or government support services (Nadvi 1999a).
Such resources can stimulate learning processes and
innovation among cluster-based SMEs, ultimately leading
to increased sales and profit margins (Schmitz 2004). In
terms of active benefits, SMEs in a cluster can intentionally
collaborate, particularly with the help of business associ-
ations (Nadvi 1999a). For example, cluster-based firms
actively cooperate to jointly purchase raw materials,
engage in collective export-oriented marketing, and find
common solutions to financing or logistics challenges
(UNIDO 2013). Unanimous agreement in the industrial
cluster literature indicates that such clusters have the
potential to enhance industrial development processes in
local economic regions in developing countries (Gereffi
and Lee 2014; Giuliani et al. 2005; Nadvi 1999b; Schmitz
2004).
Whereas the traditional cluster literature prioritizes the
stimulation of local economic development processes, a
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growing body of literature now seeks to investigate how
clusters might increase the integration of economic,
social, and environmental concerns into their firms’ core
business practices—that is, enhance corporate social
responsibility (CSR) (Gereffi and Lee 2014; Giuliani
2014; Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010; Lund-Thomsen
and Pillay 2012; Puppim de Oliveira and Jabbour 2015).
Perhaps the most extensive consideration of this topic is
the recent special issue of Journal of Business Ethics that
takes stock of this literature stream. In their overview
article, Lund-Thomsen et al. (2014) argue that literature
on CSR in industrial clusters is fairly limited, concen-
trated mostly on environmental pollution controls, labor
rights issues (and child labor in particular), and poverty
reduction. More recently, some efforts seek to conceptu-
alize the promotion of CSR in industrial clusters, such as
by identifying how so-called low-road, window-dressing
(i.e., clusters that preach but do not practice CSR), and
rights-oriented clusters contribute to or undermine the
promotion of human rights (Giuliani 2014). Gereffi and
Lee (2014) also suggest that improvements in the quantity
and quality of jobs in industrial clusters may be linked to
what they call private, social, and public governance, all
of which drive forces of social upgrading in local
industrial districts in the developing world. Knorringa and
Nadvi (2014) further argue, in the context of the so-called
Rising Power economies, that the formal and informal
institutional context of clusters helps explain the (lack of)
attention paid to social and environmental aspects of
cluster development processes.
Yet one aspect remains underexplored: the influence of
international donor agencies in facilitating or undermining
collective action among SMEs in response to the CSR
concerns of their foreign buyers (Lund-Thomsen and Pillay
2012). Donor funding is important, because it adds finan-
cial resources, know-how, expertise, and political attention
(Easterly 2007) that otherwise might be neglected by local
policy makers (Browne 2006). Furthermore, donor funding
that aims specifically to promote the development of the
private sector has increased significantly in recent years
(Estrup 2009). But international funding agencies have also
been accused of promoting poorly designed projects that
were not formulated locally, or that failed to match the
priorities of local governments or other stakeholders. Thus,
Western funding agencies are sometimes perceived as
agents of a wider, neo-imperialist project aimed at keeping
developing countries dependent on former colonial powers
(Hancock 1994). Using international donor funds to pro-
mote the private sector in developing countries may also
distort local competition and markets (Estrup 2009).2
In this article, we contribute uniquely to literature on
donor-supported CSR interventions in clusters in devel-
oping countries in conceptual, empirical, and managerial
terms. First, we develop a conceptual framework of some
factors that may explain why donor-sponsored CSR pro-
jects succeed or fail to promote collective action in
industrial clusters in developing countries. In developing
this framework, we combine insights from literature on
international development aid, CSR in developing coun-
tries, and the role of clusters in regional development
processes. Second, this article makes an empirical con-
tribution related to international donor agencies and CSR
in industrial clusters in developing countries, in that we
analyze a case study of a donor-sponsored intervention in
the Sialkot football-manufacturing industry of Pakistan.
Our analysis demonstrates how and why this project was
discontinued after a short implementation period. Third,
in managerial terms, our article provides insights into the
circumstances in which international aid agencies can(not)
use CSR to support collective action processes in indus-
trial clusters in developing countries. In this regard, our
study focuses on an intervention sponsored by an inter-
national development agency (IDA), whose purpose was
to ascertain if CSR could provide a foundation for a
process of collective coordination in SME clusters in
developing countries. We study a critical case of such a
donor-supported project and find that factors related to the
international political economy of aid, the national
implementation context, internal conflicts among the
SMEs, and skepticism toward CSR by the SMEs led to
the discontinuation of the project.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: In the
next section, we outline our analytical framework. We
2 In industrial clusters in developing countries, relatively few
empirical studies investigate the potential or limits of donor funding
Footnote 2 continued
for promoting CSR (e.g., Gulati 2012; de Oliveira and Fortes 2014).
Some studies investigate work undertaken by international develop-
ment agencies to promote CSR in the tannery and football clusters of
Kasur and Sialkot, Pakistan, and the football-manufacturing cluster of
Jalandhar, India. These studies mostly consider questions of the long-
term ownership and sustainability of donor interventions to promote
cluster-based CSR initiatives (Lund-Thomsen 2009; Lund-Thomsen
and Nadvi 2009, 2010). A recent study of the Jalandhar cluster
indicates that a donor agency promoted the long-term adoption of
CSR practices within the cluster, but the CSR activities mostly took
the form of philanthropy, without changing the core business prac-
tices of the local cluster-based SMEs or the work conditions for local
employees (Jamali et al. 2015). In practitioner literature, the New
Delhi–based Foundation for Medium, Small, and Microenterprises
produced a three-volume report, covering the roles and responsibili-
ties of policy makers, implementing agencies, and change agents
(‘‘cluster development agents’’), from international donor agencies or
national (government) agencies. The guidelines, recommendations,
and best practice case examples focus on how-to ideas and what
works (FMC 2013a, b, c).
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discuss and combine insights from literatures on interna-
tional development aid, CSR in developing countries, and
the role of industrial clusters in regional development
processes. The resulting conceptual framework clarifies the
circumstances in which donor-sponsored CSR projects are
(un)likely to promote collective action in industrial clusters
in developing countries. Next, we describe the methodol-
ogy, sampling strategy, multiple data generation methods,
and data analysis procedures. This section also introduces
the project we study, which we call the CSR SME network.
After providing an overview of the Sialkot football-man-
ufacturing cluster, in which various CSR interventions
have been undertaken, we present our empirical analysis of
the CSR SME network in Sialkot, combining insights from
our conceptual framework with the empirical analysis to
uncover factors that led to the discontinuation of the CSR
SME network in Pakistan. Finally, we highlight our main
findings and draw implications for analyses and practices
of donor-financed CSR interventions in industrial clusters
in developing countries.
Analytical Framework
In this section, we explore, in conceptual terms, whether
international donor-financed CSR projects help or hinder
the promotion of collective action in industrial clusters in
developing countries. We start by reviewing the interna-
tional literature on the pros and cons of donor funding as a
form of support for local change processes in the devel-
oping world.
Political Economy of Aid
As Table 1 summarizes, researchers in development stud-
ies often describe donor funding either as a blessing or a
curse for promoting economic, social, and environmental
change processes in developing countries (Parks 2008;
Riddell 2007). International donor funding can contribute
much needed financial resources in times of fiscal austerity,
enabling the implementation of state, private sector, and
government projects and programs (Groves and Hinton
2013). In particular, such financial support may lead to
greater prioritization of issues such as human rights, health
and social welfare provisioning, and the rights of women
than would otherwise have been the case without the
influence of international funding agencies (Mavrotas
2010). Non-traditional donors from the Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) have also spon-
sored infrastructure improvements in other developing
countries and economies in transition. At least in theory,
such investments may induce positive spillovers in the
form of local enterprise development and job creation
(Mawdsley 2012).
Donor funding can also take nonfinancial forms, such as
technical expertise or know-how that helps government,
private sector, or nonprofit entities boost their administra-
tive capabilities, human resource management techniques,
or finance/accounting knowledge (Browne 2006). In addi-
tion to technical transfers of know-how, Western donor
funding tends to be accompanied by participatory, gender-
friendly policies and approaches to the workings of gov-
ernment, private sector, and nongovernmental
Table 1 Arguments for and against international donor funding
Arguments for international aid Arguments against international aid
International donor funding involves financial resource transfers that
make state, private sector, and government projects and programs
possible in times of financial austerity (Groves and Hinton 2013)
Development aid is often wasted due to bureaucratic inefficiency,
misguided donor policies, excessive executive salaries, and political
corruption (Hancock 1994)
Donor funding ensures that policy areas such as human rights, health
and social welfare provisioning, and the rights of women receive
higher priority in developing countries than they would otherwise
(Mavrotas 2010)
Western organizations are ineffective in mitigating global poverty. The
West needs to face its history of ineptitude and colonialism (Easterly
2007)
Non-traditional donors from the BRICS and some Western donors
finance infrastructure improvement projects that—at least in theory—
provide positive spillovers in the form of local business and job
creation in developing countries (Mawdsley 2012)
Donor funding is traditionally time-bound (e.g., between one and three
years), so an intense transfer of know-how and financial resources
must take place within this time frame, raising questions about the
long-term sustainability of such interventions (Lund-Thomsen 2009)
Donor funding in the form of technical expertise and know-how might
help local actors boost their administrative capabilities, human
resource management techniques, and finance and accounting
knowledge (Browne 2006)
Donor interventions are often undertaken without sufficient
coordination, resulting in duplication and overlap of activities
(Nunnenkamp et al. 2013)
Donor funding promotes participatory and gender-friendly policies and
approaches in the developing world (Groves and Hinton 2013)
Aid consultancy industries must help international donors monitor and
evaluate activities to ensure they serve the needs of the original target
groups in the developing world (Groves and Hinton 2013)
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organizations (NGOs) in the developing world. Moreover,
development aid in the form of financial or nonfinancial
transfers may support economic, social, and environmental
elements of local change processes in developing countries
(Groves and Hinton 2013).
However, donor funding may in some circumstances
become a curse (Easterly 2007). Traditionally, donor pro-
jects are time-bound interventions that last between 1 and
3 years. An intense transfer of know-how and financial
resources must take place within this time frame. This
raises questions about the long-term viability of such
interventions when external financial and know-how
resource flows no longer drive them (Lund-Thomsen
2009). This points to the importance of local ownership of
development aid projects or programs, in that many pro-
jects are driven by external actors, according to their own
interests, without involving local actors in their design,
execution, or monitoring. Some donor interventions might
thus prioritize policy areas that are not in line with the
needs of developing country actors (Richmond 2012).
Another criticism of donor-financed interventions notes
that they often fail to ensure sufficient coordination with
other governmental or donor initiatives, which can lead to
duplicated efforts and overlapping activities (Nunnenkamp
et al. 2013).
Finally, donor funding might create perverse incentives
for various local actors (Easterly 2007). Some recipients of
development aid—whether individuals or institutions—
actively seek to attract donor funding that they subse-
quently use to sustain luxurious lifestyles, with few or no
benefits reaching the intended beneficiaries (Hancock
1994). Entire aid consultancy industries have emerged in
some developing countries, in response to the needs of
international donors to monitor and evaluate aid interven-
tions to ensure they serve the interests of the intended
beneficiaries in the developing world and demonstrate
results to tax payers and voters in developed countries
(Groves and Hinton 2013).
In the past 15 years, the debate on donor-funded inter-
ventions in the developing world has focused increasingly
on whether support to private sector firms enhances or
undermines the development of national industries and
companies (Kragelund 2005; Schulpen and Gibbon 2002).
On the one hand, some of the preceding arguments also
apply to private sector interventions. Donor-funded assis-
tance might help local firms upgrade their products and
production processes, move to higher value-added func-
tions in the value chain, or use competitive skills learned in
one industry to gain competitive advantages in another
(Staritz 2012). Moreover, aid to private sector firms, par-
ticularly SMEs or microenterprises, may help address the
capacity constraints that poor and marginalized groups
often face in terms of their effective participation in local,
national, or international value chains or markets (Hum-
phrey and Navas-Aleman 2010). From this point of view,
donor support to the private sector in developing countries
should involve partnerships with international buyers (Al-
tenburg 2007; Humphrey and Navas-Aleman 2010),
because local firms in developing countries may be more
likely to react to market-based incentives in the form of
changing buyer demands. If donor-supported interventions
involve buyers actively, the likelihood of developing
country firms taking ownership of private sector develop-
ment aid interventions is thought to increase (Pattaconi and
Weisert 2013).
On the other hand, donor staff or hired consultants may
lack knowledge and skills to run private enterprises, donor
interventions may be poorly coordinated with national
government agencies or other donors, local enterprises may
not be sufficiently involved in the process of project for-
mulation, and these local actors may lack interest in the
issues addressed by the donor intervention, in that they will
halt these activities once donor funding expires (Lund-
Thomsen 2009). Donor support in favor of private sector
firms also might distort local competition and developing
country markets by helping some local enterprises in their
development at the expense of other firms that do not
receive such support (Estrup 2009).
National CSR Context
The international political economy of aid has an important
role in co-determining whether private sector donor inter-
ventions succeed, yet the national context of CSR also has
implications for how such interventions fare. Literature on
CSR acknowledges that national institutional contexts
matter for how CSR is understood in distinct geographical
settings (Brammer et al. 2012; Gond et al. 2011; Jamali
et al. 2015). For this discussion, institutions refer to ‘‘the
rules of the game in society or, more formally…the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’’
(North 1990, p. 3). For example, in their examination of
how CSR was institutionalized in North American and
European contexts, Matten and Moon (2008, p. 409) note
that explicit CSR (which is more widespread in North
America) involves corporate policies that define responsi-
bility for broader societal interests, whereas implicit CSR
(more prevalent in continental Europe) refers to norms,
values, and rules that are institutionalized ‘‘in (mandatory
and customary) requirements for corporations to address
stakeholder issues and that define proper obligations of
corporate actors in collective rather than individual terms.’’
However, institutional perspectives on CSR largely
ignore so-called fragile states (Azizi and Jamali 2015).
Broadly defined, fragile states are countries that share a
common characteristic: ‘‘the inability—for whatever
A. Fayyaz et al.
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reason—to fulfill basic state functions’’ (Gisselquist 2014,
p. 9). Fragility and governance are two interrelated but
conceptually distinct notions. Fragility is a characteristic of
the state; governance pertains to the institutions and norms
characterizing how power gets exercised within a given
sate. Therefore, state fragility may be a function of both
weaknesses in state institutions and the functioning and
priorities of national governments. Yet even democratic
governments are in some instances unable to guarantee
public security, uphold the rule of law, or provide public
goods if their state institutions are weak or in need of
substantial reform (Gisselquist 2014). Regarding aid pro-
visioning in such contexts, the relative effectiveness of
donor funding for stimulating local growth and reducing
poverty appears significantly lower in fragile states than in
other, more stable contexts. Therefore, both academics and
policy makers question the capacity of fragile states to
absorb aid efficiently (Feeny and McGillivray 2009).
Literature on donor support to fragile states highlights
the need to take domestic factors and local contexts into
account when designing aid interventions, while also
advocating for local ownership of interventions. Interna-
tional-level actors can provide aid and reform incentives,
but leadership at the national level is key for restoring
confidence in domestic institutions (Gisselquist 2014). In
our analytical framework, we expect that donor support to
CSR in industrial clusters in developing countries is more
challenging in fragile states, such as Pakistan. In other
words, while donor funding has the potential to provide
knowledge, expertise, and funds in support of local joint
action in clusters in developing countries, its outcomes
depend substantially on the relative state of public security,
whether the rule of law can be enforced, and the extent to
which the state can provide public goods in cluster settings.
Collective Action in SME Clusters
In this section, we explore how donor-financed CSR inter-
ventions relate to the promotion of collective action among
SMEs in industrial clusters in developing countries. Prior
literature predicts that SMEs in developing countries benefit
from being co-located in geographically demarcated clus-
ters, in both active and passive ways (Schmitz and Nadvi
1999).When firms in the same or related industries co-locate
geographically (Giuliani 2005), SMEsmay benefit in passive
ways, because clusters grant them access to a skilled labor
force, logistics and transportation providers based in the
cluster, specialized input suppliers, and buying or sourcing
offices that can help mediate customer requirements (Nadvi
1999b). Moreover, training institutes and locally available
consultants likely facilitate upgrading of products, produc-
tion processes, and human resources. Formal and informal
SME networks ease the circulation of innovative ideas,
production knowledge, and personnel, compared with the
flows available to SMEs in the same industry that are geo-
graphically separated (Schmitz andNadvi 1999). In addition,
SME clusters may benefit in active ways from their co-lo-
cation, because they can cooperate to address challenges
such a lack of adequate infrastructure; the need for improved
human resources, technology, or machinery; and ready
sourcing of raw materials or marketing capabilities (Nadvi
1999a). Such joint initiatives may be undertaken through
industry associations or in cooperation with public sector or
international donor agencies.
With our analytical framework, we seek to identify cir-
cumstances in which donor-financed CSR projects provide a
basis to support collective coordination in SME clusters in
developing countries. Although clusters in developing
countries have the potential to facilitate local economic
development processes, they have also come under fire for
engaging in socially or environmentally destructive activi-
ties (Blackman 2006). Evidence indicates that SMEs in
leather tanning, foundry, and textile clusters in particular
engage in highly polluting activities that threaten the health
of local inhabitants and the environment, especially those
located in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Lund-Thomsen
et al. 2014). Cluster-based SMEs have also been accused of
using child and forced labor, paying below poverty-level
wages, and generally squeezing workers’ conditions in a
downward spiral, competing in a ‘‘dirty’’ fashion with other
local and international producers (Khan 2010).
Donor-financed CSR interventions then might play an
important role in promoting collective action among SMEs
to address the social and environmental externalities that
arise from economic development processes in local clus-
ters in the developing world, particularly by promoting
CSR initiatives (Lund-Thomsen and Pillay 2012; Puppim
de Oliveira and Jabbour 2015). In a related development,
donor agencies have begun promoting value-chain inter-
ventions as a new form of private sector development aid
(Humphrey and Navas-Aleman 2010; Staritz 2012),
including the promotion of CSR in global value chains
more broadly (Estrup 2009). The global value-chain liter-
ature highlights how local SMEs, selling in international
markets, increasingly encounter more stringent social and
environmental performance requirements by their interna-
tional buyers (Egels-Zande´n 2015; Skadesgaard Thorsen
and Jeppesen 2010). In particular, international supermar-
kets, brands, and retailers appear to dominate and orches-
trate vast supplier networks in developing countries. The
concept of global value-chain governance in turn describes
how these retailers dictate what kinds of products are to be
produced, at what price, and in which social and environ-
mental conditions in developing country export industries
(Gibbon and Ponte 2005). Many social and environmental
requirements are written down, in codes of conduct or
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ethical guidelines that suppliers of international buyers
must follow. For example, suppliers commit to provide
workers with minimum wages, overtime payments, and
social insurance (Barrientos and Smith 2007).
We speculate that donor funding can help co-finance SME
investments in social and environmental upgrading of facto-
ries (Lund-Thomsen and Pillay 2012). Moreover, donor
funding could help facilitate compliance with CSR require-
ments of international buyers, because local cluster-based
associations or formalized SME networks might share CSR-
related know-how and training (Nadvi 2004). Such shared
know-how usually starts with local or international consul-
tants. In addition, donor funding may be instrumental in
gathering various stakeholders to participate in joint action
initiatives that can ensure social and environmental
improvements bySMEs inparticular clusters (Khan2007a, b).
SME Perceptions of CSR
However, international donor-financed CSR interventions,
aimed at promoting collective action in industrial clusters
in developing countries, may be unsuccessful if they do not
build on a sufficiently strong business case for CSR (Gulati
2012). That is, there must be clear financial incentives for
cluster-based SMEs to invest in social and environmental
upgrading, whether in the form of cost reductions (e.g.,
reduce wasted raw materials), efficiency enhancements
(e.g., increased labor productivity), higher prices paid by
existing or new CSR-conscious buyers, or compliance with
governmental regulations that either force the SMEs to
upgrade or close down (Lund-Thomsen et al. 2014).
The donor financing of CSR initiatives might also be
unsuccessful if cluster-based SMEs perceive the social and
environmental priorities of the donor agencies as a form of
economic or cultural imperialism (Khan and Lund-Thomsen
2011). Ruwanpura and Wrigley (2011) and De Neve (2014)
explore the perceptions, by SMEmanagers in the developing
world, of CSR as a form of cultural and economic imperi-
alism imposed on them by foreign customers. For example,
the requirement against the use of child labor might be seen
as a cultural imposition in contexts where children’s work is
regarded as a form of job training that will secure these
children and their families a future source of livelihood in the
absence of adequate, locally available, and affordable
schooling options (Lund-Thomsen 2008). Similarly, SME
managers may regard CSR as economic imperialism
imposed by buyers that demand constant declines in unit
prices but refuse to co-finance investments in social and
environmental upgrading of factories, even while insisting
that developing country suppliers be socially and environ-
mentally responsible (Khan and Lund-Thomsen 2011).
Finally, donor-financed CSR interventions may be
unsuccessful in promoting collective action among cluster-
based SMEs if the local enterprises have not been involved
in the project formulation or execution or if the donor
funding halts after a relatively short period, without
allowing cluster-based SMEs to achieve sufficient levels of
social and environmental upgrading prior to the termina-
tion of the project funding. Figure 1 summarizes this
described analytical framework.
In short, in our analytical framework, donor-financed
CSR interventions potentially catalyze collective action in
industrial clusters in developing countries by co-financing
social and environmental upgrading processes in cluster-
based SMEs, transferring CSR know-how and training,
facilitating multi-stakeholder dialogues, and involving
local business associations in joint action initiatives. These
donor-financed CSR interventions can help cluster-based
SMEs address the CSR concerns of their international
buyers on a collective basis in ways that would not have
been possible for single SMEs. However, our analytical
framework also recognizes that donor-funded CSR initia-
tives aimed at promoting collective action in industrial
clusters in developing countries may not succeed if the
cluster-based SMEs do not perceive a business case for
engaging in CSR, view the donors as trying to promote
their own imperialistic priorities, are not sufficiently
involved in the project design, or do not receive donor
funding for a sufficiently long period to establish the
required levels of resources, trust, and collaboration.
Methodology
Case Study Selection
We use a qualitative methodology, so that we can inves-
tigate the complex phenomenon of donor-financed CSR
interventions that might promote collective action among
Presence of Collective Action Absence of Collective Action 
Donor-
Financed CSR 
Interventions
Co-financing of social and 
environmental upgrading
Know-how and training
Facilitation of multi-
stakeholder dialogue
Support for joint action 
initiatives
Lack of business case for CSR 
compliance
Donor agencies perceived as 
agents of economic and 
cultural imperialism
Lack of SME involvement in 
project design
Donor funding for brief period
Fig. 1 Donor-financed CSR interventions and collective action in
industrial clusters
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cluster-based SMEs in a specific socio-economic and
socio-cultural context, taking multiple factors into account
that might explain the process of (non)engagement in
collective action in a particular cluster (Eisenhardt 1989;
Reast et al. 2010, 2013; Yin 2013). We chose the Sialkot
football-manufacturing cluster in Pakistan as the focus.
This critical case study enables us to make inferences, of
the type ‘‘If this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to
all (no) cases’’ (Flyvbjerg 2006, p. 230). That is, to test the
prediction that donors can use CSR to promote collective
action among SME networks in industrial clusters in
developing countries, the Sialkot case study can likely
yield useful insights. Cluster-based SMEs in Sialkot faced
the immediate threat of losing international orders in 2007,
following Nike’s partial withdrawal from the cluster in
response to unauthorized outsourcing of football stitching
to home-based locations and evidence of labor rights vio-
lations at its main supplier Saga Sports (Seigmann 2008). If
cluster-based SMEs in Sialkot did not use CSR issues as a
basis for collective action in these circumstances, it seems
unlikely that CSR would become the basis for sustained
collective action in other clusters facing similar threats of
buyer exit. Furthermore, political unrest, security threats,
and the national law-and-order situation in Pakistan have
made development interventions after 2001 extremely
challenging to implement. If the focal IDA development
project could succeed in these conditions, similar projects
might be likely to succeed elsewhere in the developing
world, especially in less challenging environments. Finally,
we regard the Sialkot case as critical because previous
studies document the strongly held ‘‘anti-CSR’’ feelings
among local entrepreneurs and nonprofit workers, such that
using CSR as an entry point for engaging SMEs in col-
lective action might be particularly challenging in this
context (Khan 2004; Khan and Lund-Thomsen 2011). If
IDA can use CSR to promote collective action in Sialkot,
entities elsewhere can likely do the same in other clusters
in which SME managers are less skeptical of CSR. Overall,
if the IDA CSR project can succeed in promoting collective
action among cluster-based SMEs in Sialkot (a context
dominated by buyer CSR concerns, political and security
risks, and strongly held ‘‘anti-CSR’’ views), all else being
equal, such interventions should be able to succeed in
other, more politically stable clusters in developing
countries.
Case Description
We investigate an aid project supported by IDA in Sialkot
between 2008 and 2009, whose purpose was to ascertain if
issues pertaining to CSR could provide a foundation for a
process of collective action in SME clusters in developing
countries. In general, IDA sought to enable SMEs in
Pakistan to achieve greater self-reliance by building insti-
tutions and strengthening local capacities. The Pakistani
government was willing to finance IDA interventions in
five pilot clusters as part of its broader trade policy. In
2003, the government of Pakistan approved and transferred
US$211,000 to a trust fund, under an agreement to inter-
vene in these five pilot clusters. Yet the assistance to SME
clusters in Pakistan was severely constrained, because IDA,
in its own assessment, had very limited financial resources
at its disposal to execute its cluster development program
in Pakistan.
Within this broader framework, IDA decided to launch a
Soccer Village project in Sialkot in 2008, which led to the
establishment of a SME network of four football producers
and exporters, under the leadership of the President of the
Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry. We refer to
this network as the CSR SME network. Members were to
cooperate in producing and marketing responsibly pro-
duced footballs. The IDA-backed Soccer Village project
would co-fund activities undertaken by these Sialkot-based
SMEs. Neither donor nor government funds were signifi-
cantly invested, so the Soccer Village project relied heavily
on in-kind subsidization from a parallel IDA project in
India. After 18 months in operation, it ceased to function.
We investigate the development and discontinuation of
this IDA-supported CSR SME network, using fieldwork
that took place 2–3 years after the network dissolved in
2009. Our in-depth case study provides a rich, long-term
perspective on the viability of donor-financed CSR inter-
ventions aimed at promoting collective action among
cluster-based SME entrepreneurs in a highly challenging
and complex context. It also features rarely investigated
aspects of CSR, such as the discontinuation of the CSR
project. Considering the conventional and widespread
focus on best practice CSR case studies, we offer this case
with the scientific awareness that sometimes we can learn
just as much or more from cases in which things do not
work out as hoped for.
Donor-financed CSR interventions in the Sialkot cluster
have been studied extensively, in the form of projects
supported by the International Labor Organization (ILO)
and United Nations Children’s Fund (e.g., Khan 2004;
2007a, b; Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010). We focus on an
intervention by IDA between 2008 and 2009 that has not
been the subject of any academic studies (we offer a brief
history of CSR interventions in Sialkot subsequently).
Data Collection
We develop a rich case history for the IDA CSR project in
Sialkot and its attempt to promote collective action in the
CSR SME network. In 25 semi-structured, qualitative
interviews, conducted between March 2011 and October
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2012, with a broad range of stakeholders, we gained access
to various interpretations of the CSR project, including
both positive and skeptical views. We spoke to members of
the network of Sialkot football entrepreneurs involved in
the project; members of other SME networks in Sialkot; the
Sialkot Chamber of Commerce; local NGOs such as the
Independent Association for Monitoring Child Labor
(IMAC) and the Child and Social Development Organi-
zation (CSDO); government representatives from the Trade
Development Authority of Pakistan and the Small- and
Medium-sized Enterprise Authority of Pakistan; interna-
tional NGOs such as the International Labor Rights Fund
(ILRF), and industry associations such as the World Fed-
eration of Sporting Goods based in Switzerland; interna-
tional buyers such as Adidas (U.S.) and Select Sports
(Danish) that sourced footballs from Sialkot; and present
and former staff members from the European headquarters
of IDA, the organization’s Lahore office, and its field office
in Sialkot.
The interviews were recorded digitally and lasted
between 60 and 120 min each. If interviewees did not feel
comfortable being recorded, we asked for permission to
take detailed interview notes and then sent these notes to
the interviewees for corrections and feedback. All inter-
views were fully transcribed. After we had conducted
several interviews, we developed theoretical notes, as part
of the process of building a grounded theory of why the
IDA-sponsored project was discontinued (Strauss and
Corbin 1998). This iterative process sharpened our
research questions and theoretical focus for subsequent
interviews.
During the interviews, we talked to informants about
their perceptions of how and why the IDA-sponsored
project was discontinued. The interviews mixed grand
tour questions and interviewer prompts, to allow rich
insights to emerge (McCracken 1986). They also focused
on issues such as competitiveness and the CSR challenges
faced by SMEs in the football-manufacturing industry of
Pakistan, the history of SME networking in Sialkot, and
sourcing links for SME network members with national
and international buyers. We constantly engaged in
dialectical thinking, making repeated comparisons among
relevant literature, incoming data, and our emerging the-
ory. Prior to each interview, we examined publicly
available secondary material to gain further insights into
the complex case. The use of multiple data sources was
crucial for ensuring data triangulation and refining our
final interpretation of the reasons for the discontinuation
of the IDA-sponsored project (Strauss and Corbin 1998;
Yin 2013). Table 2 contains an overview of each orga-
nization/interviewee, their stakeholder groups, their mis-
sion (general), their CSR role in Sialkot, and the reasons
to include them in the study.
Data Analysis
As part of the data analysis process, we developed ana-
lytical categories with the help of open and axial coding
procedures (Strauss and Corbin 1998), through repeated
readings of literature on international donor funding,
institutional approaches to CSR, industrial clusters in
developing countries, and CSR in these contexts, in com-
bination with our interview materials. During the open
coding stage, we read and coded all parts of the interview
transcripts with a view to identifying similarities and dif-
ferences in interviewees’ perceptions of how and why the
IDA project had been discontinued. We each engaged in
our own independent analysis, exchanging notes on our
coding. Furthermore, we engaged in repeated discussion,
agreement, and disagreement about different parts of the
analysis. We then moved to the process of axial coding,
identifying higher-level categories to understand the main
reasons for how and why the IDA project had been dis-
continued. Accordingly, we generated four categories: the
political economy of aid in Sialkot, the national context of
Pakistan, joint action among SMEs in Sialkot, and SME
perceptions of CSR in Sialkot. Finally, we used selective
coding with a review, to refine our emerging theory of how
and why the IDA-sponsored CSR project in Sialkot stop-
ped. As part of our final quality control effort, we shared a
draft manuscript with researchers that had intimate
knowledge of the Sialkot cluster and donor-funded CSR
interventions in general and then incorporated their com-
ments. We also sent a draft to study informants, which
helped us ensure the factual accuracy of the manuscript and
refine our interpretation of events as they occurred in the
IDA CSR project in Sialkot (Pole and Lampard 2002).
The Cluster Context in Sialkot
The Sialkot football-manufacturing industry in Pakistan is
one of the most widely studied industrial clusters in the
developing world. Several authors have written about
issues of child labor (Khan 2004, 2007a, b; 2010), labor
rights (Seigmann 2008), labor agency (Lund-Thomsen
2013), global value-chain linkages, local CSR approaches
(Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2009, 2010), and technological
upgrading in Sialkot as well as labor standards (Nadvi
2011; Nadvi et al. 2011), and comparative work conditions
relative to other football-manufacturing countries in Asia
(Chan and Xue 2013; Lund-Thomsen et al. 2012). As
should be obvious from this list, most prior literature
focuses on labor issues. An overview of the key findings,
limitations, and insights into the role of donor-financed
CSR interventions in these studies appears in the Appendix
Table 4. The popularity of such studies may reflect the
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integration of this cluster into global value chains that link
local Sialkot football producers in Pakistan to world-fa-
mous sports brands such as Nike, Puma, Adidas, Mikasa,
and Mitre.
Located in the province of Punjab, close to Pakistan’s
border with India, the Sialkot football-manufacturing
cluster is scattered across the city and also spreads, through
subcontracting networks, to stitching units in villages
Table 2 Types of interviewees and reasons for inclusion in the study
Organization type Number of
interviewees
Stakeholder
group
Mission (general) Role in CSR in Sialkot Reasons for inclusion
Manufacturers Seven Exporter Increase profits from the
production and export of
footballs from Sialkot
Often requested by
international buyers to
ensure compliance with
CSR requirements.
Sometimes engaged in
philanthropy as well
Manufacturers were key
actors in IDA’s attempt to
use CSR to promote
collective action among
cluster-based SMEs in
Sialkot
Buyers Three Importer Source footballs of the best
possible quality at the
cheapest possible price
Need to protect their brand
reputation with customers,
trade unions, regulatory
bodies, and media. CSR
thus was a part of the risk-
management strategies
and, for some brands,
overall business
development activities
Responding to the CSR
concerns and priorities of
international buyers was
an important part of the
rationale for launching the
CSR SME network
National and
international
business
associations
Three Industry body Articulate the common
interests of members and
help them address issues
that firms might benefit
from addressing on a
collective rather than an
individual basis
Drive and implement
collective action CSR
initiatives in Sialkot
The President of the Sialkot
Chamber of Commerce
played an important role
in the IDA CSR project
Nongovernmental
organizations
Three Civil society Advocate against labor
rights abuses and help
eradicate child labor
Expose labor rights abuses,
engage in child labor
monitoring or implement
social projects transferring
children from work to
schooling
NGOs played an important
role of exposing child
labor in the Sialkot
football-manufacturing
cluster and in the
implementation of the
Atlanta Agreement
Government
agencies
Two State
representative
Significant role in designing
industrial policies that
affect the entrepreneurs in
Sialkot. They also provide
support services to SMEs
and are supposed to
regulate their activities
Governmental agencies
have helped support some
collective action
initiatives in Sialkot, but
they have also been
accused of not ensuring
that national labor and
environmental laws are
implemented by SMEs in
Sialkot
Governmental support
agencies supported other
SME networks in Sialkot
while they were not
directly involved in the
IDA project
Academics Four Independent
observers
To conduct independent
academic research, teach
and supervise students,
and communicate expert
knowledge to the broader
public
Independent academics
have conducted several
studies of the background,
history, and effects of
CSR interventions in
Sialkot
To obtain an independent
view of the unfolding of
the IDA project and the
reasons for its
discontinuation
IDA Three Donor funding
agency
To support economically,
environmentally, and
socially sustainable
industrial development
processes
Key driver of the
establishment of the CSR
SME network in Sialkot.
IDA also made the final
decision to discontinue the
CSR SME network
To obtain its view on the
development and
discontinuation of the
CSR SME network in
Sialkot
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around the city. The football-manufacturing cluster supply
chain features four tiers: large enterprises (20), medium
enterprises (50?), small or microenterprises (400?), and
subcontractors, whether makers or vendors (1000?), which
employed about 20,000 registered workers in 2014.
This local manufacturing value chain produces a range
of footballs: professional match balls, practice/camp balls,
promotional balls, indoor balls, and futsal soccer balls. The
Sialkot football-manufacturing cluster has traditionally
been known for its hand-stitched footballs, though inter-
national demand for hand-stitched balls has dropped sig-
nificantly in the past decade, and the industry is in a state of
transition toward more mechanized forms of production,
including machine-stitched footballs and thermo-molded
technology. The industry also faces significant competitive
challenges from producers in China that have been quicker
to adopt the new, more technologically advanced machine-
stitched and thermo-molded production methods. Apart
from industries in Pakistan and China, India and Thailand
are among the main production locations for football
manufacturing worldwide (Nadvi et al. 2011).
The focus on CSR compliance in the Sialkot cluster can
be traced back to the early to mid-1990s, when interna-
tional news reports highlighted the use of child labor in the
stitching subcontracting networks that linked exporting
firms inside Sialkot to vast networks of contractors and
home-based stitchers in the surrounding villages (Khan
2004). Children often helped their parents in stitching
footballs, sometimes at the expense of their formal
schooling. In 1997, a large multi-stakeholder initiative,
involving United Nations agencies, the ILO, Save the
Children, and the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce, sought to
eradicate child labor from the industry (Lund-Thomsen and
Nadvi 2010). Backed by international sports brands, the
initiative aimed to transfer child stitchers from home-based
work to formal schools in the Sialkot district, establish a
cluster-wide mechanism for monitoring child labor, and
retrain or compensate families to make up for the loss of
income associated with their children leaving the
occupation and entering formal schooling (Khan 2007a, b).
This multi-stakeholder initiative, also known as the Atlanta
agreement, largely eliminated the use of child labor from
football stitching in Sialkot, though it also had the unin-
tended side effect of excluding female workers from the
stitching supply chain. Male family members would often
not permit women to venture beyond the confines of their
own homes to engage in any kind of work outside the home
(Khan 2007a, b; Lund-Thomsen et al. 2012).
Despite the initial success of the Atlanta agreement, in
terms of eliminating child labor from the cluster, wider
concerns about labor rights persisted. The Sialkot cluster
seemingly addressed the issue of child labor, but interna-
tional sports brands moved on, demanding compliance with
a wider range of labor rights, such as the use of formal
contracts, minimum wages, and social insurance for
stitchers (Seigmann 2008). The vast majority of these
stitchers were undertaking their work in semi-formal, vil-
lage-based stitching centers or at home, where these labor
rights were not guaranteed. Thus, there was an increasing
mismatch between the CSR demands of the cluster’s
international buyers and what the local SMEs could offer in
terms of CSR compliance (ILRF 2010). In addition,
international buyers were concerned about the lack of
technological upgrading and innovation in the cluster, as
local manufacturers had not switched sufficiently quickly
from hand- to machine-stitching or thermo-molded pro-
duction (Lund-Thomsen 2013).
As we describe in Table 3, within this wider context,
Nike decided to stop sourcing footballs from what was then
the world’s largest manufacturer, Saga Sports, in late 2006,
allegedly due to its unauthorized outsourcing of football
stitching from village-based stitching centers to home-
based locations in the Sialkot district. Although no child
labor was found in Nike’s supply chain, the risk of children
being involved in football stitching constituted a major
reputational threat to Nike (Lund-Thomsen and Coe 2015).
Nike attempted to engage in remediation with Saga Sports
over an extended, six-month period, to find a solution, but
Table 3 Timeline of CSR challenges and solutions in the Sialkot cluster
Time Challenge Solutions
Mid-1990s Media exposes child labor in the football stitching value chains
of global brand manufacturers in Sialkot
Atlanta agreement
2005–2007 Discovery of unauthorized outsourcing of football stitching and
labor rights violations at Saga Sports, Nike’s key football
supplier in Sialkot
Nike ends relationship with Saga Sports and redirects sourcing
to China and Thailand. Nike then re-enters Sialkot,
cooperating with a new vendor, Silverstar that promised to
meet Nike’s code of conduct
2007–2009 The Nike crisis threatens the viability of the cluster, and fears
loom that other buyers will follow Nike in leaving Sialkot
International funding agencies such as IDA seek to introduce
new CSR projects and concepts, such as the Soccer Village
project
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it did not appear as if Saga Sports realized the gravity of
the concern. Therefore, Nike withdrew officially from not
just Saga Sports but the Sialkot cluster as such (Seigmann
2008). In doing so, it attempted to redirect its sourcing of
hand-stitched footballs to China and Thailand but discov-
ered, in early 2007, that some of the continued demand for
high-quality, hand-stitched footballs could only be met by
Pakistani manufacturers. In the spring of 2007, Nike re-
entered Sialkot, sourcing a smaller volume of hand-stitched
balls from a new vendor that agreed to Nike’s code of
conduct and guaranteed that all hand stitching of footballs
would take place inside its factory premises (Nadvi 2011).
The exit of Nike from Sialkot sparked the interest of
international donor agencies, which sought to help the
cluster address CSR issues, so that it could ensure the
continued, long-term viability of local enterprises,
employment, and incomes in Sialkot at a time when
international buyers appeared to be searching for more
‘‘CSR-safe’’ production locations (Lund-Thomsen and
Nadvi 2009; Skadesgaard and Jeppesen 2011).3
Empirical Findings
We detail our empirical findings by analyzing the factors
that contributed to the discontinuation of the CSR SME
network in Sialkot. These factors reflect the four categories
derived from the coding of the interview data: (1) the
political economy of aid in Sialkot, (2) the national context
of Pakistan, (3) joint action among SMEs in Sialkot, and
(4) SME perceptions of CSR in Sialkot.
Political Economy of Aid in Sialkot
A significant reason why the CSR SME network was dis-
continued in Sialkot appeared to be that IDA withdrew
from the project before the CSR SME network could be
fully institutionalized within the cluster. As one network
member explained,
This network was in between success and failure,
because the project was initiated by IDA, and it was
[then] discontinued and rolled back after some time.
The project had a very short life cycle, whereas the
CSR SME network was at the initial stages [of its
formation]. The entrepreneurs wanted that since the
project was initiated in collaboration with IDA, IDA
should fund the project. Not only marketing the
Soccer Village products but also arranging for the
participation of the network members in foreign
exhibitions. IDA should have facilitated the promo-
tion and introduction of the project to the market.
In other words, the entrepreneurs expected IDA to shoulder
a substantial part of the costs of initiating the project. They
also anticipated that the agency would finance the initial
participation of network members in foreign trade fairs.
However, from the viewpoint of IDA, these assumptions of
the SME network members in Sialkot reflected their failure
to appreciate the importance of the entrepreneurs making
their own financial contributions to the project. A key
principle of IDA’s cluster development approach is that
project activities should not be undertaken solely through
IDA funding. The lack of commitment by the SME
network members to the project thus constituted an
important reason that IDA discontinued its support.
However, even as representatives of the European IDA
headquarters explained the dissolution of the Soccer
Village project by citing a lack of engagement by local
stakeholders, other stakeholders asserted that insufficient
time had passed for IDA to convince the entrepreneurs of
the business case for CSR or for the network members to
invest in the functioning of the Soccer Village network.
For example, a local nonprofit representative, who fol-
lowed the evolution of the CSR SME network closely,
noted,
The CSR SME network of IDA could not materialize,
although seminars and workshops were held and
awareness was created about this project. IDA left
early. IDA should have conceived the idea in a better
way. A proper feasibility study should have been
conducted to determine if this could be achieved.
IDA should have replicated some other design, which
had proved successful in some other area, sector, or
country. IDA phased out early and could not persuade
3 The Sialkot Chamber of Commerce already had established a CSR
cell and a Child and Social Development Organization (CSDO), with
the help and support of WFSGI and FIFA, to promote social
development programs within the cluster and coordinate social
protection initiatives from the industry. The ILO’s International
Programme for the Elimination of Child Labor (ILO-IPEC) produced
a child labor monitoring program that included self-monitoring and
reporting components, in which local football manufacturers declared
whether they had encountered any child labor in their football
stitching supply chains. Participating football manufacturers in
Sialkot hired internal auditors. The self-reported findings were
double-checked by the ILO-IPEC’s monitors between 1998 and
2003. However, by 2003–2004, the external monitoring mechanism
was taken over by a newly formed, local, nonprofit organization, the
Independent Monitoring Association for Child Labor (IMAC). Unlike
ILO-IPEC, a donor-funded initiative, IMAC was expected to be a
self-sustainable mechanism, mostly funded by the local industry and
the Pakistan government. Most international buyers in the Sialkot
football cluster insisted that suppliers to join ILO-IPEC and then
IMAC. Nike and Adidas also performed their own independent, third-
party monitoring, because they lacked confidence in the IMAC’s
independence and ability to ensure the strict monitoring of child labor
and broader labor rights in this cluster (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi
2010).
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the industrialists. It takes time to make something like
this, which could work in Sialkot.
According to IDA’s own guidelines for cluster develop-
ment, a minimum period of 3–5 years is required for its
approach to work in a given setting. So why would IDA
initiate a CSR project aimed at promoting collective
action among SMEs in Sialkot, through the establishment
of the CSR SME network, and then withdraw before the
usually recommended period of at least three years? We
found two possible answers to this question. First, IDA
had not initially committed the funds to sustain the project
for the minimum recommended period. Financial support
for the CSR SME network project came from IDA
headquarters’ global project for CSR in industrial clusters,
funded by a bilateral donor in Europe. This project ran
from 2005 to 2008, and it included activities in various
countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. However,
unlike the practice for other participating countries, there
was no specific budget allocation for Pakistan. Thus, as
pointed out by one of the staff members in IDA’s
European headquarters,
The Sialkot CSR project was formulated as part of a
global initiative, which was not specifically aimed at
Pakistan, and there was no specific allocation of
money for Pakistan as such. Money was devoted to
specific activities in Pakistan on a needs basis, not on
the basis of some initial planning.
Second, the termination of IDA’s global program for CSR
in industrial clusters at the end of 2008 coincided with the
possible closure of IDA’s office in Lahore, Pakistan, which
had been particularly devoted to industrial cluster devel-
opment. According to IDA’s international headquarters, by
the end of 2008, the lack of buy-in for cluster development
in Pakistan had become evident, so further investments of
project resources in the country needed to be terminated. In
IDA’s Lahore-based office, the realization was also dawn-
ing that it was running out of project funds to sustain its
ongoing interventions. Engaging in the CSR SME project
enabled it to continue its work on industrial clusters
temporarily and keep the Lahore-based office open, even
without funding secured for the CSR SME network
intervention for the usual, recommended three-year period.
National Context of Pakistan
It was not just internal IDA dynamics that exerted an
influence though. The wider political context of work and
employment in Pakistan also led IDA to withdraw rela-
tively quickly from the CSR SME project, as confirmed by
both the local project manager in Pakistan and a
representative from IDA’s European headquarters. In the
words of the local project manager,
IDA had to wind up early due to the poor alignment
of the initial road map with the actual activities, due
to the worsening security situation of Pakistan. It was
difficult for local and international IDA teams to
continue their work in Sialkot due to the security
situation.
A bomb blast in the Federal Investigation Authority
building on Mall Road, Lahore, on March 11, 2008, was
located very close to the Pearl Continental and Avari
Hotels, where the IDA team stayed during its visit to
Lahore in 2006–2007. In 2008 and 2009, IDA teams were
forced to cancel visits to Pakistan, because they could not
obtain the security clearance from the United Nations to
travel there. The effect of the overall security situation in
Pakistan on the CSR SME network project was confirmed
by a representative from IDA’s headquarters,
We had quite a lot of activities initially for the first
year and a half. We also had a joint mission with the
head of the Fair Labor Association, and we planned
several activities related to engaging buyers to
improve the situation in Sialkot. Sadly, we had to
place our team on hold for quite some time due to the
worsened security situation in Pakistan.
Joint Action Among SMEs in the Sialkot Cluster
In IDA’s Lahore office in 2008, the head of the industrial
cluster development team was eager to demonstrate pro-
gress in CSR work in Sialkot after Nike’s withdrawal, yet
the Lahore office was running out of funds. He therefore
decided to bypass the usual process of training potential
network members in IDA’s cluster development method-
ology, which included networking and trust-building
exercises to strengthen linkages among potential network
members and enhance the capacity of the cluster associa-
tions to support SME networking within the cluster. This
decision was not endorsed by IDA’s international head-
quarters. From its point of view, launching such a project in
a cluster in which social capital formation was skewed
would have been premature and unlikely to produce the
expected results. Nevertheless, to get the project activities
going, the local IDA cluster development office in Lahore
decided to approach the head of the Sialkot Chamber of
Commerce to ask for support to launch an IDA-backed
CSR project in Sialkot. The then-President was a football
manufacturer; he and four of his family members owned
football-manufacturing plants, and he believed that his own
firm and those of his relatives might benefit from receiving
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capacity building, advice, and financial resources from
IDA as part of this program.
Although this connection was a convenient means for
IDA’s Lahore-based office to initiate project activities
relatively quickly on the ground, it also embodied, even if
unintentionally, a fundamental contradiction between
IDA’s cluster development methodology that emphasized
networking and trust-building among SMEs on the one
hand and the historical evolution of the Chamber of
Commerce president’s network of SME businesses in the
football-manufacturing industry on the other hand. At the
time of the launch of the CSR SME network in Sialkot, the
preexisting family networks that participated in the project
had undergone processes of decentralization, growth, and
expansion in the preceding decades. Family businesses
often split into multiple units, so that different family
members could take ownership and charge of their own
business units. But, the emphasis of IDA’s trust-building
and networking approach was to bring the SMEs closer to
one another, as articulated by a local IDA staff member in
Pakistan:
The CSR SME network was an attempt to reunite the
family businesses through the concept of networking
and trust building. Network members did not pass
through the individual and joint visioning processes
to identify the common problems of network mem-
bers. Network members did not conduct the fort-
nightly strategic meetings to initiate joint actions
through the network’s platform. CSR SME members
were required to pass through the network building
process for at least 3 years whereas the network was
terminated only after 18 months of operation.
Thus, internal conflicts arose in this family network of
businesses, including a generation gap between an older
member of the family network, the then-President of the
Chamber of Commerce, and younger members of the
family who wanted to run their businesses without
interference from their fathers or uncles. It then became
impossible for IDA’s ground-level staff to engage network
members in trust-building or networking processes. Many
of the main actors in the network simply were not
interested in getting closer to their family members.
Instead, they wished to further distance themselves from
their relatives when it came to running their individual
SME units.
The difficulties of implementing IDA’s trust-building
and networking approach cannot be attributed solely to
internal power dynamics within the network though. Dif-
ferent areas of potential cooperation might have been easier
to pursue. For example, the CSR SME network concept
entailed, at least on paper, joint marketing of its CSR
profile to international customers. However, whereas
individual SME members might have been inclined to
cooperate on production issues (e.g., joint purchasing of
raw materials), the notion of sharing information about
customers or even sharing clients was far more difficult to
accept and thus was unlikely to spark cooperation among
SME network members. As one member explained,
In my view, the concept [of networking and trust-
building among SMEs] is unique but requires a
higher level of trust and information sharing by the
member companies. I also feel that one of the major
benefits of networking is outsourcing within the
network members but that, again, requires a higher
level of trust and confidence amongst the members.
It thus appears as if the CSR SME network case does not
match the usual optimism in prior literature on industrial
clusters in developing countries that highlights the poten-
tial benefits for SMEs of engaging in active cooperation
with one another. In this case, IDA’s international head-
quarters wanted to test the assumption that CSR could
provide a basis for promoting collective action within SME
clusters, especially when cluster-based firms faced the
threat of losing international orders to international clients
due to their insufficient engagement in CSR. Yet to the
extent that such collaborative efforts involved direct
contacts with international clients, SME network members
had strong incentives not to cooperate, because when one
member obtains a new order from an international client as
a result of the CSR SME network project, it might not
generate immediate financial benefits for all network
members.
SME Perceptions of CSR in Sialkot
Prior studies document that CSR compliance pressures can
be perceived as a form of economic or cultural imperialism
by SME managers in the developing world. For example,
international buyers often demand constant price declines
from suppliers but increased CSR investments, without
being willing to share those costs. Managers in export-
oriented enterprises also assert that some of the social
conditions placed on their enterprises are culturally inap-
propriate in their local work and employment context (De
Neve 2009; Khan and Lund-Thomsen 2011; Ruwanpura
and Wrigley 2011). The perceptions of the CSR SME
network members reflected these beliefs. One international
scholar studying the project uncovered a perception among
the CSR SME network members that buyers claimed they
wanted to engage suppliers in socially responsible
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practices, but the buyers were themselves engaging in
socially irresponsible practices, as evidenced in Nike’s pull
out from Saga Sports4:
The timing of IDA’s entry into Sialkot to undertake a
[CSR] intervention was not appropriate, as Nike had
recently terminated its sourcing of soccer balls from
its lead supplier, Saga Sports, in Pakistan due to
allegations of child labor in the production chain,
leaving 7000 workers unemployed as an outcome.
The actions of Nike under the heading of CSR were
not received positively by the football producers in
Sialkot. In fact, the manufacturers and exporters in
Sialkot felt a lot of resentment towards the notion of
CSR. People [manufacturers] in Sialkot believed that
compliance issues related to child labor would fade
away with the passage of time as the buyers were
actually looking for cheaper products, and that
compliance with CSR issues was an issue that was
related to the negotiation and bargaining power of the
buyers and brands.
Therefore, the CSR SME network members did not
consider compliance with the CSR requirements of inter-
national buyers an immediate concern. At the same time,
some CSR SME network members believed that the
Sialkot football-manufacturing industry suffered a negative
international image due mainly to the work of international
funding agencies or Western media. Rather than seeing the
decline of the hand-stitched football-manufacturing indus-
try in Sialkot as a result of a lack of technological
upgrading, production scale, changing buyer demands, or
low worker productivity (as indicated by Lund-Thomsen
et al. 2012; Nadvi et al. 2011), they accused international
nonprofit and UN agencies as being responsible for the
decline in Sialkot’s overall share of global football-
manufacturing exports. As one network member observed,
International agencies including NGOs will never
participate in image building [of the industry], but
will always create negative branding. They are
directly responsible for [the] destruction of [the
Sialkot] soccer ball industry, as exhibited by the
decrease in the industry’s market share from 80 to
9 %. These agencies are directly responsible for
unemployment of 1.1–1.4 million families. Do they
want more? The hand-stitched soccer ball industry is
finished due to [the actions of] these agencies.
Thus, IDA sought to initiate the CSR SME network at a
time, when there was particularly widespread resentment
among local manufacturers against the CSR initiatives
promoted by international NGOs, buyers, and funding
agencies. In the view of some network members, the
negative publicity created by these international entities
and media outlets had damaged the industry’s reputation
beyond repair. That is,
I will say that in case of hand-stitched ball business,
external factors, mainly NGOs and others, have
brought this craft industry to such a level that no
more damage can be done.
Yet as one scholar we interviewed was careful to note, the
negative views of CSR SME network members toward
international aid agencies and their CSR activities in
Sialkot were not just an outcome of the SME network
members’ subjective perceptions. True, actual, negative
social consequences in the cluster had emerged for many
stitcher families, as a result of the decline in the hand-
stitching business, while some other local actors, including
NGOs, had benefitted from being able to obtain more funds
for their social work in Sialkot:
Women and children lost work due to local manu-
facturers’ non-compliance with international CSR
demands on the one hand, whereas [local and inter-
national] NGOs mobilized funds out of this crisis on
the other.
Because IDA tried to introduce a cluster-based CSR
initiative in Sialkot at a time when local SME manufac-
turers were especially frustrated with what they perceived
to be the double standards of international buyers, UN
agencies, and NGOs, it is hardly surprising that the CSR
SME network members were not particularly keen on
continuing the network once the external driver of IDA left
in 2009.
Conclusions
With this article, we set out to explore whether donor-
financed CSR projects might help or hinder the promotion
of collective action among SMEs in industrial clusters in
developing countries, in response to international buyers’
concern with CSR compliance downstream in their global
value chains. We propose a novel analytical framework,
linking literature on (private sector) development aid,
institutional approaches to CSR, industrial clusters, and
CSR in developing countries. In analytical terms, we thus
contribute to literature on CSR in industrial clusters in
developing countries by identifying some factors that likely
explain why international donor-financed CSR projects
succeed or fail to promote collective action in such clus-
ters. We argue that donor-funded CSR interventions have
the potential to facilitate the joint access of SMEs to
4 The network members were talking specifically about the Interna-
tional Labor Rights Forum (ILRF) here.
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demanding consumer markets in developed countries if
they are concretely linked to social and environmental
upgrading of SMEs, with know-how and training provided
over a sustained period to SME network members, initia-
tives that form part of broader multi-stakeholder initiatives
that link local SME networks to global buyers, and support
provided for joint action initiatives with business associa-
tions. However, donor-funded CSR initiatives likely fail to
promote collective action among cluster-based SMEs when
there is no clearly perceived business case (i.e., financial
rationale) for CSR engagement, when cluster-based SMEs
are insufficiently involved in project formulation, when
CSR is perceived by SMEs as a form of economic or
cultural imperialism, and when donor funding is provided
for a relatively short period. The latter circumstances
appear to have been prevalent in the case of the CSR SME
network we have studied herein.
So what are the wider implications for our understand-
ing of donor support for CSR interventions in industrial
clusters in developing countries? The CSR SME network
offers a clear example of how internal dynamics within
donor agencies influence on-the-ground implementations
of project activities. Without proper planning and execu-
tion, donor-financed CSR interventions are unlikely to be
able to support collective action processes within clusters
sustainably. However, the CSR SME network case also
demonstrates that even if such planning and execution had
taken place, with sufficient financing, there may be realistic
limits to what CSR projects can achieve in national con-
texts that are characterized by political instability, unrest,
and security threats. It simply becomes unfeasible to con-
duct project activities at the ground level in such circum-
stances. Contrary to a widespread assumption in research
on industrial clusters in developing countries—namely,
that SMEs benefit from engaging in collective action ini-
tiatives—the internal dynamics and conflicts of interest
within SME networks can create strong disincentives for
network members to engage in joint action. Finally, the
assumption that CSR can promote collective action in
industrial clusters in developing countries does not always
hold, especially if SME managers view CSR as a form of
economic and cultural imperialism. The opposition to
Western-style CSR interventions may be so strong that
they actually hinder the implementation of projects or
result in entrepreneurs sensing no ownership of the pro-
jects, which undermines the long-term viability of any such
interventions.
Thus, as Newell (2005, p. 556) predicted, ‘‘CSR canwork,
for some people, in some places, on some issues, some of the
time.’’ The intellectual challenge is to specify the circum-
stances in which CSR interventions promote joint action in
industrial clusters and produce positive outcomes for local
SMEs, workers, and communities, while also recognizing
that the interests of these actors do not always align. In some
circumstances, they even might come in direct conflict, so
policy makers must be clear about whether sufficient social
capital exists in SME networks to sustain joint action ini-
tiatives. This effort also necessitates consideration of how
local SME entrepreneurs perceive CSR and whether they are
likely to support any such engagement.
In terms of research pathways, we are clearly in need of
more empirical studies that can explicate the circumstances
in which CSR interventions in industrial clusters in
developing countries work for some people, some firms, in
some places, some of the time. Despite recent advances in
conceptual understanding of the links between industrial
clusters and CSR in developing countries, we still face a
dearth of studies that investigate the outcomes of donor-
sponsored CSR interventions in industrial clusters in
developing countries. For example, IDA and the ILO have
undertaken a range of CSR projects in India and Pakistan,
but beyond a few select insights, we know relatively little
about the potential and limitations of this approach to
private sector development in developing countries.
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Appendix
See Table 4.
Table 4 International literature on CSR in the Sialkot football cluster
Author(s) Key findings Limitations Role of donor-funded CSR
Kazmi and
McFarlane
(2003)
Child labor was eliminated in soccer ball manufacturing
as a result of the Atlanta agreement. Skilled, male
stitchers earned higher wages. A reduction took place
in family incomes as fewer family members engaged
in stitching
The data generation
methodology is not
specified in detail
It mentions the role of donor funding
agencies but does not contain any in-depth
analysis of their functioning
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Table 4 continued
Author(s) Key findings Limitations Role of donor-funded CSR
Khan
(2004)
The reality of child labor eradication
programs in Sialkot does not match the
glossy descriptions of international
donor agencies advocating these
approaches. Child labor appeared to be
eradicated in the industry as a result of
these programs, but many female
workers also lost their source of income
The study was mainly qualitative, based
on a limited number of interviews with
firms, subcontractors, and football
stitchers in the industry
It discusses the role of donor funding
agencies in promoting the eradication
of child labor within the Sialkot football
cluster. It portrays these agencies as
agents of economic and cultural
imperialism
Hussain-
Khaliq
(2004)
The leading football manufacturer Saga
Sports is a CSR-conscious company. A
change of attitude is needed among
small-scale entrepreneurs and
contractors in the cluster if its CSR
profile is to be improved
Only three interviews were conducted,
and the information was not
triangulated. Saga Sports, is praised in
the article, closed three years later after
as Nike cut its ties, on the basis of labor
rights violations and unauthorized
outsourcing of football stitching to
home-based locations
It does not deal specifically with the role
of donor agencies
Khan
(2007a,
b)
The discourse about child labor
eradication in the Sialkot football-
manufacturing industry is perceived as
a form of economic and cultural
imperialism by many football-
manufacturing firms, NGOs, and
football stitchers in Sialkot. The child
labor eradication programs in Sialkot
led to the widespread exclusion of
female stitchers from the labor force
The findings are based on ethnographic
fieldwork in Sialkot. It is thus hard to
establish whether the author’s thick
description of the working lives of
entrepreneurs, subcontractors, and
football stitchers can be generalized to
the industry as a whole or only the
limited number of informants
interviewed for the study
It contains a very critical discussion of
the role of donor agencies in promoting
the eradication of child labor within the
cluster. These agencies are seen as
agents of economic and cultural
imperialism
Seigmann
(2008)
The CSR performance of Nike’s two
football suppliers in Sialkot, Saga
Sports and Silverstar, surpass those of
other companies in the industry.
However, minimum wages were not
paid, discriminatory recruitment
practices were employed, and
environmental management was weak
at these two companies
The data generation was quite limited.
The descriptions of working conditions
were based on a brief visit to Sialkot
and interviews with an unspecified
number of workers. The only other
stakeholders interviewed were from the
Pakistani Institute of Labor Education
and Research and Silverstar’s
management
It does not contain an in-depth discussion
of the role of donor agencies in the
cluster
Lund-
Thomsen
and
Nadvi
(2010)
Local child labor monitoring systems
appear more rigorous in clusters that
supply mega-brands such as Nike and
Adidas. However, in clusters where
external scrutiny from multinational
companies is less intense, there may be
more space for local actors to develop
‘‘indigenous’’ CSR models
The study was not based on a large,
quantitative survey of firms, which
would have allowed the authors to
generalize the findings of their study to
all firms in the Sialkot and Jalandhar
clusters
It contains a comparative analysis of the
implementation of the Atlanta
agreement in the Sialkot and Jalandhar
football-manufacturing clusters. The
article argues that the implementation
was more donor and brand driven in
Sialkot than in Jalandhar
Khan and
Lund-
Thomsen
(2011)
CSR in Sialkot is a kind of Western
economic and cultural imperialism,
aimed at subjugating local suppliers
Only qualitative interviews were
undertaken with a limited number of
football manufacturer and stitchers. No
large-scale quantitative study of firm
perceptions of CSR in the Sialkot
football-manufacturing industry backs
up the findings
It does not contain any in-depth analysis
of the role of donor agencies in the
Sialkot cluster
Nadvi et al.
(2011)
Compliance with labor standards in the
Asian sports goods industry has
different implications for the
geographically dispersed producer
locations in Indian, Pakistan, China,
and Thailand. Complying with labor
standards is an insufficient basis for
Pakistan, India, and Thailand to
compete with the Chinese sports goods
industry. Other factors, such as
A fairly limited number of firms were
interviewed, so it may not be possible to
generalize the findings to all firms
operating in the football-manufacturing
industries of Pakistan, India, and China
It does not contain any in-depth
discussion of the role of donor agencies
in the promotion of CSR within the
cluster
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